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1. Introduction 
  It is frequently difficult to determine the set of equilibrium payoffs in discrete 
time  repeated  games  with  imperfect  public  monitoring  when  the  discount  factor  is 
bounded away from one.  In the continuous time case Sannikov [2007] and Sannikov and 
Skrzypacz  [2007]  have  obtained  striking  characterizations  of  the  equilibrium  set  in 
continuous time games where the public signals are modeled as a diffusion process, with 
the players’ actions altering the diffusion’s drift but not its volatility.   These continuous-
time models are motivated as modeling the limit of very high frequency interactions, 
which raises the question of what sorts of high-frequency limits the models capture. This 
in  turn  depends  on  the  relationship  between  the  signal  processes  in  discrete  and 
continuous time.  Fudenberg and Levine [2009] (hereafter referred to as FL) show by 
example that the same limiting diffusion processes can  arise as the limit of different 
discrete-time structures that have very different limit equilibria. 
In characterizing the “cooperative” equilibria of a repeated game it is necessary to 
understand which “punishment schemes” are incentive compatible for players. This can 
be  thought  of  as  testing  for  whether  a  deviation  has  occurred  combined  with  a 
punishment if the test is failed. Intuitively, as with the normal distribution, the tails of a 
diffusion process permit a very accurate test for the difference in means by using a cutoff 
for the signal, above which the test is considered to have “failed.” However, since the 
worst possible punishment in a repeated game is bounded, what matters is not just the 
accuracy of the test but whether defections can be detected with sufficient probability. As 
we  approach  continuous  time  as  the  limit  of  shorter  discrete  intervals,  the  question 
becomes how rapidly the probability with which defections can be detected decreases 
relative  to  the  size  of  available  punishment.  If  the  only  way  to  create  a  sufficiently 
accurate test is to send the cutoffs very quickly to infinity, then punishment will occur too 
rarely to provide sufficient incentives for cooperation. In this case we can expect that 
there will only be static equilibria in the limit.  Consequently a key question is whether it 
is  possible  to  design  a  test  that  finds  an  appropriate  balance  between  accuracy  and 
frequency of punishment as the period length shrinks. For concreteness we will illustrate 
this idea in a simple principal-agent game instead of the repeated game studied in FL.   3
  In  many  –  if  not  most  –  cases  of  interest,  the  public  signal  is  not  literally 
continuously distributed, but the diffusion process arises as the limit of the aggregate of 
many small discrete events such as price changes. In this case we are interested not in the 
normal distribution per se, but rather a distribution that approaches normality in the limit. 
It might be hoped that a version of the central limit theorem could be used to examine the 
convergence properties of the test statistic. Unfortunately as periods shrink the optimal 
cutoff  increases  in  such  a  way  that  the  probability  of  detection  decreases  (the  cutoff 
normalized by the standard deviation increases) so the standard central limit theorem is 
not useful. Instead what is required is an estimate of the tail probabilities, that is of the 
probabilities of very unlikely but informative signals.
2   
The most closely related result in the literature is what Feller [1971] calls a  “large 
deviations”  theorem,  although  that  term  is  now  used  for  other  things.  Feller’s  result 
applies only to i.i.d. random variables, and not to triangular arrays; this note provides the 
additional  uniformity  assumptions  needed  to  adapt  the  Feller  proof  to  the  case  of 
triangular arrays  and adapts the proof to show how these uniformity assumptions are 
used.  The result reported here can then be used to show that the equilibria of discrete-
time games whose signals are binomial arrays do indeed converge to the equilibria of the 
associated continuous time game, as it was in FL’s study of games with a long run player 
against a myopic opponent.  In the next section we sketch a simpler one-shot agency 
problem where the tail probability estimates can be used in similar way.
3 
2. A Motivating Example 
  The information issues that arise in repeated game setting arise in a simplified 
form even in a principal-agent problem, as we now show. Suppose that there is a period 
of length τ . At the beginning of the period the agent may choose not to be employed by 
the principal in which case he receives zero. If he chooses employment he must decide 
between  working  (W)  and  shirking  (S).  If  he  works  he  is  paid  an  amount  Wτ  
                                                 
2 This issue is delicate because the likelihood ratio between signals between two normal distributions with a 
common variance and different  mean becomes unbounded in the tail: this  was originally exploited by 
Mirlees [1974]. 
3 Sadzik and Stachetti [2012] study the limit of discrete-time agency problems when the discrete-time 
signals have a continuous density as opposed to being the sum of discrete random variables. Their “hidden 
action” case corresponds to the example presented here. 
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proportional to the length of time he works. If he shirks he gets a bonus of Gτ . At the 
end of the period, a principal observes a noisy signal y  of the agent’s lack of effort and if 
this signal exceeds a threshold  y  he imposes a fixed penalty  P . Notice that  P  is not 
proportional to the length of the period; the idea is that the principal can impose a long-
term punishment on the agent if he feels the agent has shirked even for a short period of 
time.  For  example  if  the  principal  can  fire  the  agent,  then  we  would  expect  that 
/ P W r = , which is the amount that the agent would have earned from a lifetime of 
employment with the principal. 
The question we wish to address is for particular distributions of y  whether it is 
possible to set the threshold y  so that the agent can be induced to work rather than shirk. 
Notice that whether or not it is desirable to do this depends on payoffs to the principal 
which we do not specify. 
  Let p represent the probability that the punishment is received if the agent works 
and q  the probability of punishment if the agent shirks. Then if it is to be optimal for the 
agent to work rather than shirk then it should be that the incentive constraint 
  ( )
q p G
P
ρ τ
τ
−
≡ ≥ .   
holds. This is similar to (1) in FL. If it is to be optimal to choose employment then the 
participation constraint should be satisfied, that is 
  ( )
p W
P
µ τ
τ
≡ ≤ . 
If in the limit as  0 τ →  both of these are to hold for some values of  , , G P W  then it must 
be that lim ( ) 0 ρ τ >  and lim ( ) µ τ < ∞. This is analogous to Corollary 2 in FL. 
  We suppose that the signal y  is generated by stochastic process  0 S  if the agent 
works and process  1 S  if the agent shirks. This state of the appropriate process is observed 
at the terminal time  τ , and we shall be interested in the case where  τ  is small. The 
simplest  and  quite  standard  way  to  do  this  is  to  assume  that  d S   are  diffusions  with 
common  volatility  2 σ   and  drift  d =  0,1  respectively,  so  that  the  signal  is  distributed 
as 2 ( , ) N dτ σ τ . 
Consider first the incentive constraint  
 
( / ) (( )/ )
( )
q p y y σ τ τ σ τ
ρ τ
τ τ
− Φ −Φ −
= =    5
It is easy to ensure that  ρ remains bounded away from 0 as  0 τ → ; for example when  
the normalized cutoff  / z y σ τ ≡  is a   constant independent of τ ,  0 lim ( ) τ ρ τ → = ∞ .  
However, with  z  fixed,  ( ) p z = Φ  is a fixed positive constant, so   ( ) / p µ τ τ = → ∞  
and in the limit the participation constraint would be violated. Hence we must allow 
z → ∞  as  0 τ →    to have  / p τ  bounded above.  Thus the question becomes whether 
it  is  possible  to  keep  / p τ   bounded  above  at  the  same  time  allowing  z   to  grow 
sufficiently slowly that  ( ) ρ τ  remains bounded away from zero. The answer depends on 
the behavior of the normal distribution Φ  in the upper tail where  z  is large, and using 
bounds for the normal distribution Fudenberg and Levine [2007] show that in fact it is 
impossible to do so. Hence the agent cannot be induced to work when the time period is 
very short. 
  The problem with this analysis in an economic setting is that economic signals are  
unlikely  to  exactly  follow  a  diffusion  process,  and  in  many  cases  will  not  have  a 
continuous density when examined at a sufficiently fine scale. For example, the observed 
signal  might  be  aggregate  sales,  which  is  the  sum  of  a  number  of  discrete  random 
variables representing individual sales opportunities. As such we might expect from the 
central limit theorem that to a good approximation it follows a diffusion, and thus that the 
probabilities of correctly detecting a deviation and of falsely suspecting one could both 
be  computed  using  the  normal  distribution.  However,  as  we  saw,  in  order  to  reach 
conclusions about incentives it is necessary to know what the probability of the signal is 
for very unlikely values of the normalized cutoff  z , and the central limit theorem does 
not help with this.  Instead, to analyze a sequence of games where the signals are a sum 
that is approaching a diffusion limit, an extension of the central limit theorem to tail 
probabilities is needed.  
  To illustrate the usefulness of the tail probability bound, consider signals that are 
generated as the sums of the binomial random variables  ( ) j Y ∆  with outcomes  1/2 σ ± ∆  
where  the  probability  of  the  positive  signal  under  action  0  is  0 .5 α ≡ ,    and  the 
probability under action 1 is  1/2
1 .5 .5 / α σ = + ∆ .  Then the expected values of the two 
binomials  are  0  and  ∆,  and  their  standard  deviations  are  both  equal  to  σ .    Define 
/ k τ = ∆ to be the number of intervals of length ∆ that occur during a period of length 
τ , where we assume that  τ  is an integral multiple of  ∆. We take the signal to be the 
sum of these binomials during the period   6
 
1 ( )
k
j j y Y
= = ∆ ∑ . 
Hence  y  has variance  2 σ τ  and mean either 0 or  τ  depending on whether the action 
taken is work or shirk. 
     To apply the central limit theorem, we should assume that the number of 
observations per period k grows large even as  0 τ → . The key issue is that for k  large 
while y  is approximately normal it is not exactly normal, so the normal bounds used in 
Fudenberg and Levine [2007] do not apply directly. Moreover, Fudenberg and Levine 
[2007] use bounds in the upper tail of the normal, the convergence of which are not 
guaranteed by the central limit theorem.  Hence we will need a version of the central limit 
theorem that applies to the tail probabilities. This in turn requires that as the period length 
0 τ →   the number of observations per period  k  grow “sufficiently  fast.”  In  fact a 
sufficient condition will be  2/7
0 lim exp( ) k τ τ → → ∞. 
The best theorem we know of is the “large deviations” result of Feller [1971, pp. 
548-553], which  gives conditions under which the c.d.f. of normalized sums  n F  satisfy 
 
1 ( )
1
1 ( )
n
n
n
F x
x
−
→
−Φ
 
as the cutoff  n x → ∞. Feller’s theorem is proven and applies only in the context of the 
standard central limit theorem – that is, the sum of i.i.d. random variables. In our setting 
we are dealing with a triangular array, so we must extend Feller’s result to that case. The 
main part of the paper proves the relevant theorem (the “main theorem”), which gives 
four conditions that enable us to reach the same conclusion for triangular arrays. 
The  first  two  conditions  are  technical  conditions  on  the  cumulant  generating 
function that are easily shown to be satisfied in the binomial case; see FL Lemma A.2.  
Thus it remains to verify the third and fourth conditions, which  are  that   1/6 0 n n x − →  
and  n x → ∞. 
  In our case as we vary τ  and k  and implicitly ∆ we will generally wish to alter 
the cutoff  y  and the normalized version  / z y σ τ ≡ . Suppose first that the cutoff is 
asymptotically very large in the sense that  1/6 liminf 0 k zk−
→∞ > .  Then it is shown in 
FL Lemma A.5 that the cutoff is sufficiently far out in the tail that there is inadequate 
punishment: that is  / 0 q τ →  (and consequently since q p ≥  also / 0 p τ → ).  Hence 
we may assume the third condition of the main theorem. The fourth condition of the main   7
theorem requires z → ∞ ;  if not,  then the punishment probability does not go to zero, 
and as noted above this results in a trivial equilibrium. Hence we may apply the main 
theorem and since 
 
1 ( )
1
1 ( )
n F z
z
−
→
−Φ
 
the normal bounds used in Fudenberg and Levine [2007] can be applied to conclude that 
all limit equilibria are trivial. 
3. The Setup 
As  indicated,  we  extend  an  argument  concerning  i.i.d.  random  variables  from 
Feller [1971, pp. 548-553] to the case of triangular arrays. We adopt Feller’s notation to 
the maximum extent feasible. We suppose that we are  given  for  each  n  a sequence 
n
i Z 1, , i n = …  of  . . . iid  random variables with zero mean, variance  2
n σ  and cumulative 
distribution function  n F . We define 
 
1
n n
n i i z Z
= = ∑ . 
This has distribution  n F ∗, while the normalized sum  / n n z n σ  has distribution  n F . 
Let  ,φ Φ   respectively  denote  the  c.d.f.  and  density  of  the  standard  normal 
distribution. Recall that the cumulant generating function
4 is defined as the logarithm of 
the moment generating function 
  ( ) log ( ) x
n n e F dx ζ ψ ζ
∞
−∞
≡ ∫ . 
By the usual properties of the moment generating function,  n z  has cumulant generating 
function  ( ) n nψ ζ . The derivatives of the cumulant generating function at zero are the 
corresponding  central  moments:  '(0) , ''(0) var( ) n n
n i n i EZ Z ψ ψ = =   and  so  forth.  Our 
goal is to prove the following result: 
Main Theorem: Suppose 
1. For some  0 s >  and all  0 s ζ ≤ ≤  there is a continuous function  2( ) 0 ψ ζ >  and 
constant  0 B >  such that  
                                                 
4 Also called the bilateral Laplace transform.   8
  2
0 lim sup ''( ) ( ) 0 n s n ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ →∞ ≤ ≤ − →  
and  for  all  n 
 
{ }
2
0 0 0 max sup | '''( ) |,sup | ''''( ) |,sup | '''''( ) | s n s n s n B ζ ζ ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ ζ ψ ζ ζ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ <  
2.  n σ σ → , 
3
3 3
n
n i M E Z M ≡ → < ∞ 
3.  1/6 0 n n x − →  
4.  n x → ∞ 
Then 
 
1 ( )
1
1 ( )
n
n
n
F x
x
−
→
−Φ
 
4. Basic Facts 
The following version of the central limit theorem is taken from Feller.  
Berry-Esseen Theorem:
5 for all x  
 
3
3
9 | |
| ( ) ( ) |
n
i n
n
E Z
F x x
nσ
−Φ ≤ . 
We also use some basic results about the standard normal distribution. 
Lemma 1: 
1 ( )
lim 1
1 ( )
x
x x
x
φ −
→∞ =
−Φ
 
proof: This follows from l’Hopital’s rule. 
 
1 2 ( ) (1 ) ( )
lim lim 1
1 ( ) ( )
x x
x x x x
x x
φ φ
φ
− −
→∞ →∞
− +
= =
−Φ −
. 
￿ 
Lemma 2: If Assumptions 1 and 2 of the main theorem hold then  2 2 (0) ψ σ = . 
                                                 
5 Feller uses the constant 3 instead of 9; Wolfram gives 33/4 which is slightly smaller than 9. The exact 
value of the constant is not important in what follows.   9
Proof:  Because  it  is  the  cumulant  generating  function  for  n
i Z , 2 ''(0) n n ψ σ = .  By 
Assumption 2 2 2
n σ σ → . By Assumption 1 if  0 ζ →  then  2 ''( ) (0) n ψ ζ ψ → . But by a 
diagonalization argument we can then choose  0 ζ →  sufficiently fast that  " 2 ( ) n ψ ζ σ → . 
￿ 
5. The “Associated” Distribution 
Feller’s proof replaces the normalized sum  n z  and its cdf  n F ∗ with  a different 
random variable. This “associated” random variable has probability measure given by the 
cdf   
  ( ) ( ) ( ) n
x
n n s sy n
s V x e e dF y ψ ∗ − ∗
−∞
≡ ∫   
where s  is a positive constant.  The next result shows that this function integrates to 1 
and so is indeed a cdf.    
Lemma 3:  
  ( ) ( ) 1 n n s sy n e e dF y dy ψ
∞
− ∗
−∞
= ∫  
Proof: 
 
log ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
sx n
n n e dF x n s sx n n s e e dF x e e ψ ψ
∞ ∗
−∞
∞ − ∗ −
−∞
∫ = ∫  
and the result follows from the fact that  n z  has cumulant generating function n nψ . 
￿ 
 Notice that  n
s V ∗has a thicker right tail than  n F ∗. The idea is that by applying the Berry-
Esseen theorem to  n
s V ∗, we can pull this back to the thinner tailed  n F ∗ to get a bound 
that will apply even for large values of x . First we develop some basic properties of  n
s V ∗ 
Lemma 4:  n
s V ∗ has mean  ' ( ) n n s ψ  and variance  "( ) n n s ψ . 
Proof: Follows by computing the cumulant generating function for  n
s V ∗ 
 
*
( ) ( ) log ( ) ( ) log ( )
( ) ( )
n
s
x n s x n
s n V
n n
e dV x n s e dF x
n s n s
ζ ζ ψ ζ ψ
ψ ψ ζ
∞ ∞ ∗ + ∗
−∞ −∞
= = − +
= − + +
∫ ∫  
￿   10
Lemma 5:  n
s V ∗ is the cumulative distribution function of the sum of n i.i.d. random 
variables with distribution  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) n
x
s sy
ns n V x e e dF y ψ −
−∞
≡ ∫  
 
Proof: This follows from the basic properties of the exponential function: multiplying a 
density by an exponential of the integrand commutes with the taking of convolutions.
6 
￿ 
6. Sketch of the Proof 
We want to give a sufficient condition for 
 
1 ( )
1 0
1 ( )
n
n
n
F x
x
−
− →
−Φ
 as  n x → ∞. 
The idea is to introduce an intermediate quantity  n A  and give a sufficient condition that 
 
1 ( )
1 0
n
n
n
F x
A
−
− →  
and 
  1 0
1 ( )
n
n
A
x
− →
−Φ
, 
the two together then giving the desired result. The first step will follow by applying the 
Berry-Esseen theorem to the thick tailed  n V ∗. The second step shows that when we 
thicken the tail by multiplying by a carefully chosen exponential we do not shift  * n
s V  too 
much to the right. To carry out this second step we need the key condition  1/6 0 n n x − → . 
 
7. Proof of the Main Theorem 
7.1. First step 
Invert the relationship  ( ) ( ) ( ) n n n s sx n
s dV x e e dF x ψ ∗ − ∗ =  to find  
                                                 
6 Note the basic one-tailed nature of the argument: we can thicken the tail while preserving convolutions 
only if we multiply by an exponential. While this thickens one tail, it also thins the other tail. 
   11
 
( ) ( ) ( ) n n n s sx n
s dF x e e dV x ψ ∗ − ∗ = , and in particular 
  ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) n
n n
n n n s sy n
n n n s
x n
F x F x n e e dV y ψ
σ
σ
∞ ∗ − ∗ − = − = ∫ . 
7.2. Second step 
Choose  n s   to  depend  on  n   (and  thus  indirectly  on  , n n x σ )  so  that 
'( ) n n n n x n n s = σ ψ , or equivalently 
  '( ) / n n n n s x n = ψ σ . 
Since  2 2
0 lim sup ''( ) ( ) 0, ( ) 0 n s n ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ →∞ ≤ ≤ − = >   for  all  [0, ] s ζ ∈ ,  n σ σ →  
and  / 0 n x n →  a solution in [0, ] s  exists for large enough n .  
Lemma 6: If Assumptions 1,  2, and 3  of the main theorem hold then  0 n s → , 3 0 n ns → , 
2 2 ''( ) (0) n n s ψ ψ σ → = ,and   ''( ) n n n s n s ψ → ∞ 
Proof:  Because  '(0) 0 n
n i EZ ψ = = ,  and  '( ) / n n n n s x n ψ σ = ,  by  the  mean  value 
theorem  we  may  write  ''( ) / n n n n n s x n ψ ζ σ =   where  [0, ] n s ζ ∈ .  Then  since 
/ 0 n x n → , so does  
 
''( )
n n
n
n n
x
s
n
σ
ψ ζ
= . 
Hence  2 ''( ) (0) n n s → ψ ψ  by  2
0 lim sup ''( ) ( ) 0 n s n ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ →∞ ≤ ≤ − → . 
  Now write  
 
3 1/6
3
''( )
n n
n
n
n x
ns
−     =       
σ
ψ ζ
, 
giving  3 0 n ns → . Finally 
 
''( )
''( )
''( )
n n
n n n n n
n n
s
s n s x
ψ
ψ σ
ψ ζ
= → ∞. 
 
￿ 
7.3. Third step 
Define the quantity  n A  by replacing 
n
n
s V ∗ in the expression from step 1   12
  ( ) ( ) n n n
n
n n
n s s y n
s
x n
e e dV y ψ
σ
∞ − ∗ ∫  
by a normal with mean  '( ) n n n s ψ  and variance  ''( ) n n n s ψ  
 
2 ( ) (1/2)( '( )) / ''( ) 1
2 ''( )
n n n n n n n
n n
n s s y y n s n s
n
x n n n
A e e e dy
n s
ψ ψ ψ
σ π ψ
∞ − − − ≡ ∫  
We rewrite  n A  in a more convenient form. Use the substitution 
  '( ) ''( ) n n n n y n s t n s = + ψ ψ  
and the fact that the lower limit of integration  '( ) n n n n x n n s = σ ψ  to find 
 
2 [ ( ) '( ) ] ''( ) (1/2)
0
1
2
n n n n n n n n n s s s ts n s t
n A e e dt ψ ψ ψ
π
∞ − − − = ∫  
Complete the square in the numerator to get 
  ( )
2 [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 1 ( ''( )) n n n n n n n n n s s s s s
n n n n A e s n s − + = −Φ ψ ψ ψ ψ  
7.4. Fourth Step 
Use Lemmas 4 and 5 to apply the Berry-Esseen theorem to 
n
n
s V ∗ and find for all 
y  
 
[ ]
3
3/2
'( ) 9
( )
''( ) ''( )
n
n n n n
s
n n n n
y n s M
V y
n s n s
ψ
ψ ψ
∗   −   −Φ <      
 
where  3 n M  is the third absolute central moment of 
n ns V .
7 
7.5. Fifth Step 
How close is  n A  to our target 1 ( ) n
n F x − ? 
                                                 
7  The  parallel  claim  in  Feller’s  proof  is  the  related  but  different  inequality 
3
3
'( ) 9
( )
''( )
n n n
n n
y n s M
V y
n n s
ψ
σ ψ
∗   −   −Φ <       
. This claim seems to be an incorrect application of the Berry-Esseen 
theorem  which requires the variance of  * n V rather than  2
n σ  in the denominator   13
2
2
( ) ( ) (1/2)( '( )) / ''( )
( ) (1/2)( '( )) / ''( )
(
| 1 ( ) |
1
( )
2 ''( )
1
( )
2 ''( )
n n n n n n n n n n
n
n n n
n n n n n n n
n
n n
n n
n
n n
n s s y n s s y y n s n s n
s x n x n
n n
n s s y y n s n s n
s x n
n n
n s
F x A
e e dV y e e e dy
n s
e e dV y e dy
n s
e
ψ ψ ψ ψ
σ σ
ψ ψ ψ
σ
ψ
π ψ
π ψ
∞ ∞ − − − − ∗
∞ − − − ∗
− − =
−
 
  = −  
   
=
∫ ∫
∫
) '( )
( )
''( ) ''( )
n
n
n n
s y n n n
s x n
n n n n
y n s
e dV y dy
n s n s σ
ψ φ
ψ ψ
∞ − ∗
    −       −             
∫
 
Integrate by parts to find 
  ( )
( )
| 1 ( ) |
'( )
( )
''( )
'( )
( )
''( )
n n n n n
n n n
n
n n
n
n n
n s s x n n n n n n
s n n
n n
n s s y n n n
n s x n
n n
F x A
x n n s
e e V x n
n s
y n s
e s e V y dy
n s
ψ σ
ψ
σ
σ ψ
σ
ψ
ψ
ψ
− ∗
∞ − ∗
− − ≤
  −     Φ −       
  −     + −Φ        ∫
 
Now plug the bound from Step 3. 
 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
3 ( )
3/2
3 ( )
3/2
3 ( ) '( )
3/2
| 1 ( ) |
9
''( )
18
''( )
18
''( )
n n n n n n
n n
n n n n n
n n n n n
n
n n
n n s s x n s y
n
x n
n n
n n s s x n
n n
n n s n s s
n n
F x A
M
e e s e dy
n s
M
e
n s
M
e
n s
∞ − −
−
−
− −
  ≤ +  
 
=
=
∫
ψ σ
σ
ψ σ
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
   
where the last step follows from  '( ) n n n n x n n s = σ ψ . We can rewrite this as 
   
( ) '( ) 3
3/2
1 ( ) 18
| 1 |
''( )
n n n n n
n
n s n s s n n
n n n n
F x M
e
A A n s
ψ ψ
ψ
− −
− ≤
   
 
Now from Step 2 
  ( )
2 [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 1 ( ''( )) n n n n n n n n n s s s s s
n n n n A e s n s ψ ψ ψ ψ − + = − Φ ,  
Plugging in on the right and rearranging terms yields 
   14
( )
2
3
3/2 [(1/2) ''( ) ]
1 ( )
| 1 |
18
1 ( ''( )) ''( ) n n n
n
n
n
n
n s s
n n n n n
F x
A
M
e s n s n s
ψ ψ ψ
−
− ≤
  −Φ  
 
Then using the definition of φ  we have  
 
( )
1
3
1 ( )
| 1 |
18 2 ( ''( )) ( ''( ))
''( ) 1 ( ''( ))
n
n
n
n n n n n n n n
n n n n n
F x
A
M s s n s s n s
s s n s
π ψ φ ψ
ψ ψ
−
−
− ≤
−Φ
 
From  proof  of  lemma  6  0 n s →   so  the  first  factor  converges  to  0.  From  Lemma  6 
''( ) n n n s n s ψ → ∞ so use Lemma 1 to conclude that the second factor converges to 1 
and so the entire right-hand side converges to 0. 
Note that for this result we do not need  1/6 0 n n x − → ,  1/2 0 n n x − →  would be 
sufficient. 
7.6. Sixth and Final Step 
We must now show 
  ( ) 2 [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 1 ( ''( ))
1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
n n n n n n n n n n n n s s s s s
n n
s n s A
e
x x
ψ ψ ψ ψ − + − Φ
= →
− Φ − Φ
 
We will do this by showing that both 
 
2 [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 1 n n n n n n n n n s s s s s e ψ ψ ψ − + →  
and 
  ( ) 1 ( ''( ))
1
1 ( )
n n n
n
s n s
x
−Φ
→
− Φ
ψ
. 
7.6.1. Final Step First Half 
 
2 [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 1 n n n n n n n n n s s s s s e − + → ψ ψ ψ  
or equivalently 
  2 ( ) [ ( ) '( ) (1/2) ''( ) ] 0 n n n n n n n n n n g s n s s s s s = − + → ψ ψ ψ . 
Observe that  (0) 0, '(0) 0, ''(0) 0 n n n g g g = = = . Hence by the mean value theorem    15
  3 ( ) (1/ 6) '''( ) n n n n g s g s ζ = . 
By the uniform boundedness assumptions on the third through fifth derivatives of  n ψ  
'''( )/ n g n ζ  is uniformly bounded, so by Lemma 6  ( ) 0 n n g s →  provided 1/6 0 n n x − → . 
7.6.2. Final Step Last Half 
  ( ) 1 ( ''( ))
1
1 ( )
n n n
n
s n s
x
ψ −Φ
→
−Φ
 
From Lemma 6  ''( ) n n n s n s ψ → ∞ and since  n x → ∞, Lemma 1 implies that  t 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
1
1
(1/2)[ ''( ) ]
(1
1 ( ''( ))
lim
1 ( )
( ''( )) ( ''( ))
1 ( ''( ))
1 ''( )
lim
( )
1 ( )
1 ( )
( ''( ))
lim
''( ) ( )
''( )
n n n n
n n n
n
n
n n n n n n
n n
n n n
n
n n
n
n
n n n n
n
n n n n
s n s x n
n n n
s n s
x
s n s s n s
s n s
s n s
x x
x
x
x s n s
s n s x
x
e
s n s
e
ψ
ψ
ψ φ ψ
ψ
ψ
φ
φ ψ
ψ φ
ψ
→∞
−
→∞ −
→∞
− −
−
−Φ
−Φ
−Φ
−Φ
=
−Φ
−Φ
=
=
=
2 2 2 /2)[ ''( ) '( ) / ] '( )
''( )
n n n n n n s n s n s n n
n n n n
s
s s
ψ ψ σ ψ
σ ψ
  −  
 
Consider first by the mean value theorem for some 0 n n s ζ ≤ ≤  
 
2
2
'( ) ''( ) (0)
1
''( ) ''( ) (0)
n n n n n
n n n n n n n n
s s
s s s s
ψ ψ ζ ψ
σ ψ σ ψ σ ψ
= → =  
where we apply Lemma 6 to find the limit. So we are left with showing 
  [ ]
2 2 2 ( ) ''( ) '( ) / 0 n n n n n n n n h s n s s s   = − →   ψ ψ σ . 
Here  (0) 0, '(0) 0, ''(0) 0 n n n h h h = = =  so for some 0 n n s ζ ≤ ≤  
  3 ( ) (1/6) '''( ) n n n n n h s h s ζ = . 
Again by the uniform boundedness assumptions on the third through fifth derivatives of 
n ψ ,  '''( )/ n h n ζ   is  uniformly  bounded,  so  by  Lemma  6  this  is  true  provided 
1/6 0 n n x − → .   16
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